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EVIDENTIARY SURROGACY AND RISK
ALLOCATION:
UNDERSTANDING IMPUTED KNOWLEDGE AND
NOTICE IN MODERN AGENCY LAW
Marin R. Scordato*
There are powerful benefits available to a principal who enters into
an agency relationship. The law allowing authorized agents to act as
legal representatives of another permits the person on whose behalf the
agent is acting to extend her legal personality beyond its natural limits
and to do business on a scale far beyond her personal capacity. The law
of agency also makes the world of purely legal persons, such as
corporations and governments, possible.
Problems with agents acting on behalf of principals, especially
corporate principals, have attracted serious and sustained attention in the
last few years. Simply to say the names of Tyco, Enron, WorldCom,
Arthur Andersen, and Waste Management now conjures up an image of
agent misbehavior on a grand and costly scale. This recent history has
served to focus popular and political attention on the possibilities for
renewed reform of corporate governance and more aggressive regulation
of the agents that serve corporations. Inevitably, such an effort must
engage, and build upon, the most basic doctrines of agency law. Are
such doctrines ready to provide the necessary support?
Along with the powerful benefits available through agency, so too
comes significant risk and exposure. An agent may bind a principal to
an unwanted contract with another.1 The principal may be liable to third
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1. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 8A, 8A cmt. a (1958); Fedders Corp.
v. Taylor, 473 F. Supp. 961 (D. Minn. 1979); Lee v. YES of Russellville, Inc., 784 So.
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parties for torts inflicted upon them by the agent.2 Also, a principal may
be deemed to have legally received certain knowledge or notice that has,
in fact, been received only by the agent.3 This last possible consequence
of an agency relationship resides at the very heart of agency law, and it
is the focus of this article.4
2d 1022 (Ala. 2000); Reuter v. Middlebrook, 131 N.W.2d 817 (Iowa 1964); Hooper v.
Merchants' Bank & Trust Co., 130 S.E. 49 (N.C. 1925); Texas Conservative Oil Co. v.
Jolly, 149 S.W.2d 265 (Tex. Civ. App. El Paso 1941); See WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE
LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 57 (3d ed. 2001).
2. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 219 (1958); Gleason v. Seaboard Air
Line Ry. Co., 278 U.S. 349 (1929); United Mine Workers of America v. Patton, 211
F.2d 742 (4th Cir. 1954); Scott v. Ross, 140 F.3d 1275 (9th Cir. 1998) (applying
Washington law); Girard v. Trade Prof'l, Inc., 13 Fed. Appx. 865 (10th Cir. 2001)
(applying Kansas law); Ex parte Wild Wild West Social Club, Inc., 2001 WL 700606
(Ala. 2001); St. Joseph's Reg'l Health Ctr. v. Munos, 934 S.W.2d 192 (Ark. 1996); Otis
Elevator Co. v. First Nat'l Bank of San Francisco, 124 P. 704 (Cal. 1912); Dis. of
Columbia v. Hampton, 666 A.2d 30 (D.C. 1995); Woods v. Cole, 693 N.E.2d 333 (Ill.
1998); Oliphant v. Town of Lake Providence, 192 So. 95 (La. 1939); DiCentes v.
Michaud, 719 A.2d 509 (Me. 1998); Shafer v. Bull, 194 A.2d 788 (Md. 1963); Semrad
v. Edina Realty, Inc., 493 N.W.2d 528 (Minn. 1992); McHaffie By and Through
McHaffie v. Bunch, 891 S.W.2d 822 (Mo. 1995); H-D Irrigating, Inc. v. Kimble Props.,
Inc., 301 Mont. 34 (2000); Ashby v. First Data Res., Inc., 497 N.W.2d 330 (Neb. 1993);
Wright v. State, 778 A.2d 443 (N.J. 2001); Nowack v. Metro. St. Ry. Co., 60 N.E. 32
(1901); W.R. Grace & Co. v. Strickland, 124 S.E. 856 (N.C. 1924); Doan ex rel. Doan
v. City of Bismarck, 632 N.W.2d 815 (N.D. 2001); Dorsey v. Morris, 611 N.E.2d 509
(Ohio 1992) (holding that the agent's action was not within the scope of the agent's
employment); State ex rel. Oklahoma Bar Ass'n v. Taylor, 4 P.3d 1242 (Okla. 2000);
Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Castegnaro, 772 A.2d 456 (Pa. 2001); Baptist Mem'l
Hosp. Sys. v. Sampson, 969 S.W.2d 945 (Tex. 1998), reh'g of cause overruled, (July 3,
1998); Jones v. Mut. Creamery Co., 17 P.2d 256 (Utah 1932); Courtless v. Jolliffe, 507
S.E.2d 136 (W. Va. 1998); Hamilton v. Natrona County Educ. Ass'n, 901 P.2d 381
(Wyo. 1995).
3. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 268, 272, 278 (1958); WILLIAM A.
GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP §§ 57, 59 (3d ed. 2001); Anderson
v. Walthal, 468 So. 2d 291, 294 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) ("it is equally settled that
knowledge of, or notice to, an agent is imputed to the principal when it is received by
the agent while acting within the course and scope of employment..."); Ouachita
Equip. Rental Co. v. Trainer, 408 So. 2d 930, 935 (La. Ct. App. 1981) ("The knowledge
of the agent is imputed to the principal even if the agent neglects to specifically convey
that information to the principal.").
4. See Deborah A. DeMott, When Is A Principal Charged With An Agent's
Knowledge?, 13 Duke J. Comp. & Int'l L. 291, 291 (2003) ("[I]mputation is central to
the bases on which agency ascribes responsibility for one person's actions to another
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Generally known as the "imputed knowledge rule" this aspect of
agency law legally charges the principal with information obtained by
the agent within the scope of the agent's service for the principal.5 The
law will treat the principal as having actually received the information in
question, even if it is clear from the facts of the case that the agent failed
person and thus to agency doctrine as a whole.").
5. Curtis, Collins & Holbrook Co. v. U.S., 262 U.S. 215 (1923); Apollo Fuel Oil
v. U.S., 195 F.3d 74 (2d Cir. 1999); Martin Marietta Corp. v. Gould, Inc., 70 F.3d 768
(4th Cir. 1995) (applying Maryland law); Metro. Wholesale Supply, Inc. v. MN Royal
Rainbow, 12 F.3d 58 (5th Cir. 1994) (applying Louisiana law); Aetna Cas. and Sur. Co.
v. Leahey Const. Co., 219 F.3d 519 (6th Cir. 2000) (applying Ohio law); Employers
Ins. of Wausau v. Banco De Seguros Del Estado, 199 F.3d 937 (7th Cir. 1999), reh'g
and reh'g en bane denied, (Jan. 19, 2000) and cert. denied, 530 U.S. 1215 (2000)
(applying Wisconsin law); Tonelli v. U.S., 60 F.3d 492 (8th Cir. 1995); Morrow Crane
Co. v. Affiliated FM Ins. Co., 885 F.2d 612 (9th Cir. 1989); Cronin v. Washington Nat.
Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 663 (11 th Cir. 1993) (applying Massachusetts law); Pfenninger v.
Hunterdon Central Regional High School, 770 A.2d 1126 (N.J. 2001); Morgan v.
Jackson, 63 So. 2d 597 (Ala. 1953); Manley v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of California, 816
P.2d 225 (Ariz. 1991); Standard Motors Fin. Co. v. Mitchell Auto Co., 293 S.W. 1026
(Ark. 1927); Clark Equip. Co. v. Wheat, 92 Cal. App. 3d 503 (Cal. 1st Dist. 1979);
Reardon v. Mut. Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 86 A.2d 570 (Conn. 1952); Ruotal Corp., N. W.,
Inc. v. Ottati, 391 So. 2d 308 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 4th Dist. 1980); Chicagoland Vending,
Inc. v. Parkside Center, Ltd., 454 S.E.2d 456 (Ga. 1995); U.S. Cold Storage Co. v.
Central Mfg. Dist. Bank, 175 N.E. 825 (Ill. 1931); Wyckoff v. A & J Home Benev.
Ass'n of Creston, Iowa, 119 N.W.2d 126 (Iowa 1962); United Fuel Gas Co. v. Jude,
355 S.W.2d 664 (Ky. 1962); Weingart v. Delgado, 16 So. 2d 254 (La. 1943); Tracey v.
Standard Acc. Ins. Co., 109 A. 490 (Me. 1920); Duckworth v. Bernstein, 466 A.2d 517
(Md. 1983); Miller v. Mooney, 725 N.E.2d 545 (Mass. 2000); Pearson v. Sullivan, 176
N.W. 597 (Mich. 1920); Packard Mfg. Co. v. Indiana Lumbermens Mut. Ins. Co., 203
S.W.2d 415 (Mo. 1947); Kaeding v. W.R. Grace & Co.-Conn., 961 P.2d 1256 (Mont.
1998); Selig v. Wunderlich Contracting Co., 69 N.W.2d 861 (Neb. 1955); Taylor v.
Metro. Life Ins. Co., 214 A.2d 109 (N.H. 1965); Ford v. Grand Union Co., 197 N.E.
266 (N.Y. 1935); Am. Export & Inland Coal Corp. v, Matthew Addy Co., 147 N.E. 89
(Ohio 1925); Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Local Bldg. & Loan Ass'n,
19 P.2d 612 (Okla. 1933); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sevier, 537 P.2d 88 (Or.
1975); Hicks v. Am. Natural Gas Co., 57 A. 55 (Pa. 1904); De Ford v. Nat'l Life &
Acc. Ins. Co., 185 S.W.2d 617 (Tenn. 1945); Preston Farm & Ranch Supply, Inc. v.
Bio-Zyme Enterprises, 625 S.W.2d 295 (Tex. 1981); Macris v. Sculptured Software,
Inc., 24 P.3d 984 (Utah 2001); Agency of Natural Resources v. Towns, 724 A.2d 1022
(Vt. 1998); Boice v. Fin. & Guar. Corp., 102 S.E. 591 (Va. 1920); Bollong v. Corman,
217 P. 27 (Wash. 1923); Fritsch v. St. Croix Cent. School Dist., 515 N.W.2d 328 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1994).
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to transmit the information to the principal, and therefore clear that the
principal never actually possessed it.
6
For example, imagine an owner of an apartment building who has
engaged a property manager to operate the leasing of the apartment units
on her behalf. Standard leases for the units in the building provide to the
tenant an opportunity to extend the current leasehold on the unit for an
additional year with a rent increase of no more than 5% if the tenant
formally notifies the landlord of her intention to extend the lease no later
than two months prior to the end of the current lease term. A particular
tenant delivers to the property manager the proper notification of her
intent to extend her current lease before the deadline. The property
manager carelessly loses the notification prior to making a record of its
receipt and thus incorrectly informs the landlord that the unit is available
for re-lease at a rent increase of more than 5%. When the landlord
offers to the tenant a new lease at a rent increase of 10%, the tenant
could effectively bind the landlord to the 5% limit promised by the prior
lease, even if the landlord did not ever personally possess any
knowledge of the tenant's exercise of the lease provision. This result
would be the same no matter how blameless the landlord was in her
failure to receive the tenant's prior notice.
This is the imputed knowledge rule in action. Receipt of the notice
by the authorized agent results in the legal receipt by the principal,
regardless of whether or not the principal actually received the notice
from the agent.7
There are two well recognized exceptions in agency law to the
imputed knowledge rule. One is that a principal will not be imputed
with knowledge possessed by an agent when the agent obtained the
information from a third party to which the agent owes a duty of
6. New York Marine & Gen. Ins. Co. v. Tradeline (L.L.C.), 266 F.3d 112 (2d Cir.
2001) (applying New York law); Columbia Pictures Corp. v. De Toth, 197 P.2d 580
(Cal. 1948); Farnsworth v. Hazelett, 199 N.W. 410 (Iowa 1924); New England Trust
Co. v. Bright, 174 N.E. 469 (Mass. 1931); Westinghouse Electric & Mfg. Co. v. Hubert,
141 N.W. 600 (Mich. 1913); Cox v. Pearce, 20 N.E. 566 (N.Y. 1889); Gibson Oil Co. v.
Hayes Equip. Mfg. Co., 1933 OK 142; Hurst Boillin Co. v. Jones, 279 S.W. 392 (Tenn.
1926); Agency of Natural Res. v. Towns, 724 A.2d 1022 (Vt. 1998).
7. WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 59 (3d ed.
2001) (citing Thomason v. Miller, 555 S.W.2d 685 (Mo. App. 1977)); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 268, 272 (1958).
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confidentiality.8 For example, suppose that a certain physician works as
an employee for a particular hospital. In the course of her work for the
hospital, the physician sees an individual as a patient, examines the
individual, and diagnoses him as suffering from a serious medical
condition. Some time later, the same individual applies for and secures
a job at the hospital and, in the process of completing employment and
insurance application forms, fails to disclose the existence of the
medical condition diagnosed by the physician. The group health
insurance company for the hospital subsequently seeks to reject claims
for coverage of treatment of the individual's (now employee's) medical
condition on the grounds that the physician was aware of the existence
of the individual's medical condition at the time of initial employment,
and that therefore the hospital was legally aware of the condition
pursuant to the imputed knowledge rule. If the insurance company can
show that the hospital was legally in possession of the information, then
it can argue that the hospital breached the conditions of insurance
coverage by failing to disclose the existence of the condition to the
insurance company at the time of the individual's initial employment.
While otherwise sound, the insurance company's argument is not likely
to prevail in this circumstance because the physician obtained the
information in question within the scope of a legally confidential
relationship or transaction with the individual, and thus the usual
operation of the imputed knowledge rule is abated.
The second exception to the imputed knowledge rule applies when
the agent, whose knowledge a third party is seeking to impute to the
principal, has acted adversely to the principal during the transaction in
8. WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 62 (3d ed.
2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 281 (1958); TTT Stevedores of Texas,
Inc. v. MV Jagat Vijeta, 696 F.2d 1135 (5th Cir. 1983); Imperial Fin. Corp. v. Fin.
Factors, Ltd., 490 P.2d 662 (Haw. 1971); Farnsworth v. Hazelett, 199 N.W. 410 (Iowa
1924); Puffer v. Badley, 181 P. 1 (Or. 1919); Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 66 N.W.
518 (Wis. 1896). See Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Lineberger, 45 F.2d 522, 531 (4th Cir.
1930) ("[T]he bank is not chargeable with the knowledge which the attorney acquired in
the transaction of the business of his clients."); See generally Florence v. Carr, 148 So.
148 (Ala. 1933); Rushville Nat'l Bank v. State Life Ins. Co., 1 N.E.2d 445, 450 (Ind.
1936) ("Knowledge upon the part of its agent and examining officer cannot be imputed
to the company...").
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question.9 For example, imagine that in the course of a sales transaction,
a car salesman working for a dealership learns from a potential customer
that the customer must receive a certain minimum amount in trade for
his current car in order to be willing to purchase a new car from the
dealership through the salesman. Upon direct inspection, the salesman
learns of defects in the customer's current car that would make it
impossible to give the customer the minimum trade-in value that he
seeks. Nevertheless, badly wanting the commission on the sale, the
salesman prepares a report of the inspection as if the defects did not
exist and credits the customer the desired amount of value in trade for
his current car. When the dealership subsequently seeks a remedy
against the customer for failing to fully disclose defects in the car of
which the customer was aware at the time of the transaction as required
by the sales contract, the customer is not likely to be able to employ the
imputed knowledge rule to bind the dealership to the knowledge of the
salesman regarding the condition of the car, because the agent, the
salesman, was operating adversely to the interests of the principal, the
dealership, in the transaction in question. This is an illustration of the
so-called "adverse agent exception" to the imputed knowledge rule.
MUNROE V. HARRIMAN
Over the years, the adverse agent exception to the imputed
knowledge rule has generated significant controversy and attendant
litigation. One reasonably well known example of this litigation is the
case of Munroe v. Harriman.10 Decided by the United States Court of
9. WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 59 (3d ed.
2001); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 268, 271, 282 (1958); Evanston Bank v.
Conticommodity Servs., Inc., 623 F.Supp. 1014, 1036 (N.D. I11. 1985) ("However,
knowledge is normally not imputed when an agent is acting adversely to the principal
and for his own or another's benefit. Since the agent then has a motive for concealing
the information, one can no longer assume that he will fulfill his duty to speak."); In re
Investors Funding Corp. of N.Y. Sec. Litigation, 523 F.Supp 533, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)
("However, when an agent is acting adversely to the interest of the principal, his
knowledge and conduct are not imputed to the principal."); Duckworth v. Bernstein,
466 A.2d 517, 523 (Md. 1983) ("Where an agent acquires knowledge in the course of
his agency, and has no personal interest in the transaction adverse to the interest of the
principal, the agent's knowledge is ascribed to the principal.").
10. 85 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1936).
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Appeals for the Second Circuit on August 10, 1936,11 the case arose
from a series of transactions among Charles Munroe, the plaintiff,
Joseph Harriman, the defendant, and Harriman National Bank & Trust
Company of The City of New York, a co-defendant.1 2 As is indicated in
its name, Joseph Harriman played a prominent role in the management
and operation of the Harriman National Bank & Trust Company of The
City of New York. The court finds that, "Harriman was president of the
bank and dominated its other employees.'
3
On June 14, 1932, Munroe lent to Harriman personally, and not to
the bank, certain securities owned by Munroe. 14 Munroe's agreement to
lend to Harriman the securities was obtained by fraud on the part of
Harriman and it is undisputed by the parties that the fraud engaged in by
Harriman provided Munroe with the legal basis for rescission of the
transaction and return of the securities. 5 However, before Munroe
could seek return of the securities from Harriman, Harriman had
transferred possession of the securities to the bank so that they could
serve as part of the collateral for a loan of $380,000 (subsequently
increased to $394,000) from the bank to a corporation personally owned
and controlled by Harriman (the M.H.O. Corporation, characterized by
the court as, "one of his [Harriman's] dummy corporations.").' 6 The
loan to M.H.O. Corporation was approved by the loan committee of the
bank and, "[n]one of the officers or employees of the bank who took part
in the making of the loan, other than Harriman, were aware that the
pledged securities had been procured from Munroe by fraud."'
' 7
So Munroe had a clear right to repossess the securities from
Harriman, but Harriman no longer had possession of the securities. 8
The bank, which clearly had possession of the securities, had no direct
participation in, nor knowledge of, the fraud that gave rise to Munroe's
repossession right.' 9 One obvious response by Munroe to this dilemma
11. Id. at 493.
12. Id. at 494-95.
13. Id. at 494.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
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would be to argue that Harriman was acting as the agent of the bank
when he engaged in the fraud, thus tainting the bank with Harriman's
fraudulent acts. The court, however, rejected this approach, finding that,
"Munroe did not deal with Harriman as an agent of the bank.
Harriman's request was that the securities be lent to him personally, and
so they were. ... Hence his fraudulent representations in procuring
them cannot be attributed to the bank.,
20
Another approach available to Munroe was to argue that while
Harriman's fraudulent acts were not engaged in directly on behalf of the
bank by Harriman, Harriman certainly had knowledge of his own
fraudulent acts in obtaining the securities from Munroe at the time the
securities were offered to the bank as collateral for the loan to M.H.O.
Corporation.21 Thus, applying the basic imputed knowledge rule, it
could be said that the bank should be charged with the knowledge of its
agent Harriman regarding the legally tainted source of the securities, and
that Harriman clearly had this knowledge prior to the bank's receipt of
the securities as collateral for the loan.2  If this is the correct
characterization of events, then the bank does not enjoy the status of a
bona fide purchaser for value without knowledge at the time that it takes
possession of the securities and Munroe's claim to possession is superior
to that of the bank.23
The bank's response to this line of attack by Munroe is an
invocation of the adverse agent exception to the imputed knowledge
rule, claiming that with respect to the use of the securities by Harriman
as collateral for a loan from the bank to him, Harriman stood on the
opposite side of the transaction from the bank and thus had interests with
respect to the transaction that were in conflict, or adverse, to those of the
bank.24 Therefore, the bank argues, Harriman operated as an adverse
agent when he provided the securities to the bank as collateral for the
loan and, as a result, pursuant to the adverse agent exception to the
imputed knowledge rule, Munroe may not subsequently impute
Harriman's knowledge of the fraudulent origin of the securities to the
bank.25
20. Id.
21. See id at 494-95.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 495-96.
25. Id. at 495.
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The court in Munroe accepts this line of analysis, as far as it goes,
but pushes further to try to determine from the evidence presented
whether Harriman operated as the "sole representative" of the bank in
accepting the tainted securities as collateral for the loan.26 After
reviewing the facts, the court concludes that:
[Harriman's] will alone caused the making of the loan and the
acceptance of the collateral. Therefore he should be treated as the
sole actor on behalf of the bank as fully as though he had physically
placed the borrower's note and securities in the bank's vault and paid
over the borrowed money without the knowledge of any other
officer.
27
What difference does it make that Harriman is characterized as the
"sole actor" on behalf of the bank in the making of the loan? All the
difference, according to the court. It rules that, "In such [a] case, as
already pointed out, the corporation can claim title only by virtue of the
sole actor's act and must accept it burdened with his knowledge of the
defect in title., 28  The court is not willing to allow the bank in this
circumstance to both accept possession of the tainted securities solely as
a result of Harriman's actions on its behalf and at the same time to
disclaim the knowledge that Harriman possessed regarding the securities
because he had interests in the transaction that were adverse to the
bank.29 In other words, the court in this case fashions an exception to
the adverse agent exception to the imputed knowledge rule, holding that
a principal will in fact have the knowledge possessed by even an adverse
agent if it can be shown that the adverse agent was the sole actor or
representative for the principal with respect to the transaction in
question.30
The Munroe case is not exceptional. One reason it probably
appears in law school casebooks3' is that it represents an embrace of a
26. Id. at 496.
27. Id. at 496.
28. Id.
29. See id
30. See id
31. See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 62,
n.18 (3d ed. 2001); WARREN A. SEAVEY, STUDIES IN AGENCY 179 (1949); WARREN A.
SEAVEY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF AGENCY 177 (1964).
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sole actor exception to the adverse agent exception to the imputed
knowledge rule that is recognized by cases in a large number of U.S.
jurisdictions.32
FARR V. NEWMAN
A second well-known case that is illustrative of another line of
interesting analysis regarding the adverse agent exception to the imputed
knowledge rule is Farr v. Newman.33 This case involves a fairly simple
real estate transaction and an all-too-common occurrence of a dual
agency.34 The plaintiff in the case, Franz Farr, sought to purchase a
piece of real property from Newman for $3,000.3" Both Farr and
32. Curtis, Collins & Holbrook Co. v. U.S., 262 U.S. 215 (1923); Stone & Webster
Eng. Corp. v. Hamilton Nat'l. Bank, 199 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1952); Connecticut Fire Ins.
Co. v. Commercial Nat'l. Bank, 87 F.2d 968 (5th Cir. 1937); Maryland Cas. Co. v.
Queenan, 89 F.2d 155 (10th Cir. 1937); Queenan v. Mays, 90 F.2d 525 (10th Cir.
1937); Skud v. Tillinghast, 195 F. 1, 7 (6th Cir. 1912) and cases cited therein; Kean v.
Nat'l. City Bank, 294 F. 214, 224 (6th Cir. 1923); Wasmann v. City Nat'l. Bank, 52
F.2d 705 (6th Cir. 1931); Schneider v. Thompson, 58 F.2d 94, 97 (8th Cir. 1932);
Anderson v. Missouri State Life Ins. Co., 69 F.2d 794 (6th Cir. 1934); Nissen v. Nissen
Trampoline Co., 39 N.W.2d 92 (Iowa 1949); Nat'l Turners Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v.
Schreitmueller, 285 N.W. 497 (Mich. 1939); Blumberg v. Taggart, 5 N.W.2d 388
(Minn. 1942); Newco Land Co. v. Martin, 213 S.W.2d 504 (Mo. 1948); Aetna Cas. &
Sur. Co. of Hartford, Conn. v. Local Bldg. & Loan Ass'n, 19 P.2d 612 (Okla. 1933);
State ex rel. Clarke v. Ripley Sav. Bank & Trust Co., 160 S.W.2d 189 (Tenn. 1941);
Puget Sound Nat'l. Bank v. St. Paul Fire and Marine Ins. Co., 645 P.2d 1122 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1982); Knobley Mountain Orchard Co. v. People's Bank, 129 S.E. 474 (W. Va.
1925); State v. Candler, 728 S.W.2d 756, 759 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1986); Martin v. First
Nat'l. Bank, 51 F.2d 840 (D. Minn. 1931); Irving Trust Co. v. State Bankers' Financial
Corp., 40 F.2d 88 (S.D.N.Y. 1930); First Nat'l. Bank v. Blake, 60 F. 78 (C.C.D.Or.
1894); Tatum v. Commercial Bank & Trust Co., 69 So. 508 (Ala. 1915); First Nat'l.
Bank v. Town of New Milford, 36 Conn. 93, 101 (1869); Founche v. Merchants' Nat'l.
Bank, 36 S.E. 256 (Ga. 1900); Taylor v. Felder, 59 S.E. 844 (Ga. Ct. App. 1907);
Newell v. Hadley, 92 N.E. 507 (Mass. 1910); Tremont Trust Co. v. Noyes, 141 N.E. 93,
98 (Mass. 1923); Holden v. New York & Erie Bank, 72 N.Y. 286 (1878); Farmers' &
Traders' Bank v. Kimball Co., 47 N.W. 402 (S.D. 1890); Black Hills Nat'l. Bank v.
Kellogg, 56 N.W. 1071 (S.D. 1893); Barry v. Hensley, 98 S.W. 2d 102 (Tenn. 1936);
Vogel v. Zipp, 90 S.W. 2d 668 (Tex. Civ. App. 1936). See also, Warren A. Seavey,
Notice Through an Agent, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 16-20 (1916).
33. 199 N.E.2d 369 (N.Y. 1964).
34. See id.
35. Id. at 370-71.
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Newman executed a written memorandum recording the transaction.36
The memorandum was not in a form that could have been recorded in
the appropriate county office, and it in fact was not recorded.37
Subsequent to the execution of the agreement with Farr, Newman
learned of an opportunity to sell the same piece of property to another
person, Elbert Hardy, for $4,000.38 Newman apparently approached
Farr and asked him to match the $4,000 offer and suggested that he
would sell the property to Hardy if he failed to do so.39 Farr refused to
increase his price for the property and threatened to sue if Newman
conveyed the property to anyone but him.40 Undeterred, Newman took
$4,000 in cash from Hardy and transferred ownership of the property to
him, properly recording the conveyance. 4' Farr made good on his threat
and filed suit against Newman and Hardy, seeking specific performance
of the earlier agreement and a forced conveyance of the property from
Hardy to him.42
At this point, without more, Hardy would be in a strong position in
the suit brought against him by Farr. Hardy paid cash to Newman for
the property, he properly recorded his interest, and he had no reason to
believe prior to the purchase that there existed any other colorable
claim.43 He could have been a classic bona fide purchaser for value
without knowledge.
However, Hardy, presumably in an effort to save money and
simplify the transaction, used for the property purchase the same
attorney as did Newman, a lawyer named Cash.4 It was to this attorney
that Farr communicated his belief that his prior agreement with Newman
was enforceable and delivered his threat to sue if the property were
conveyed to anyone else.45 Attorney Cash, apparently believing that the
written memorandum executed by Farr and Newman was not legally
36. Id.
37. Id. at 371,374.
38. Id. at 374.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See id.
43. Id. at 371,374.
44. Id. at 374.
45. Id. at 371.
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enforceable, did not tell Hardy anything about it or about Farr's asserted
prior claim to the property or threat to sue.46
Now, with these additional facts, Farr is able to argue that while
Hardy himself had no knowledge of Farr's prior claim to the property,
attorney Cash certainly did. Thus, by invocation of the imputed
knowledge rule, Farr could impute the attorney's knowledge, and the
notice that Farr provided to him, directly to Hardy and thereby defeat
Hardy's claim to have been a bona fide purchaser for value without
actual notice of Farr's prior claim. As noted, under the imputed
knowledge rule, Hardy would be charged with the notice delivered to
attorney Cash even if Hardy could conclusively establish that Cash
never actually passed that notice or knowledge on to him.47
Hardy's response to Farr's use of the imputed knowledge rule was
to point out that attorney Cash represented both himself and Newman in
the sale of the property from Newman to Hardy, and that as a result
Cash, as a classic dual agent, faced an inevitable conflict of interest as
the agent for Hardy.48 In fact, as the dissent in the case notes, "It would
be hard to discover a clearer case of an attorney's representing interests
which conflicted at the very point where one client was being lulled into
security in the interest of the other client. ' 49 Thus, Hardy argues, as an
agent possessing interests adverse to his, the adverse agent exception to
the imputed knowledge rule should prevent Farr from imputing the
knowledge and notice possessed by Cash to Hardy, thereby preserving
Hardy's status as a bona fide purchaser for value without knowledge and
maintaining the superiority of Hardy's claim to the property. 50
Again, just as in the Munroe case, traditional imputed knowledge
rule doctrine stops here, accepting the validity of Hardy's analysis and
awarding him the superior right to the property.5 But again, just as in
the Munroe case, the court does not stop here.52 Without disputing that
Cash was in fact an adverse agent to Hardy and that the adverse agent
46. Id.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 268(1) (1958); WILLIAM A. GREGORY,
THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP § 59 (3d. 2001).
48. Farr, 199 N.E.2d at 371-72.
49. Id. at 375 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 371.
51. See id at 371-73.
52. Munroe v. Harriman, 85 F.2d 493, 496 (2d Cir. 1936); Farr, 199 N.E.2d at
372-73.
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exception to the imputed knowledge rule works in the way that Hardy
suggests, the court focuses on the fact that one of the primary functions
of an attorney agent in a real estate transaction is to gather knowledge,
and receive notice, of possible conflicting claims to the property. 3
The court writes, "[Hardy's] appointment of an attorney to
represent him in the acquisition of this real property, and, incidentally, to
receive notice of any outstanding equity, was also an invitation to the
public to give such notice to the attorney. 5 4 A few sentences later the
court states:
Nothing can alter the fact that the attorney was held out as a proper
person to whom notice of outstanding equities was to be given, and
that his receipt of such notice from plaintiff [Farr] was within his
authority, both as actually conferred and as apparent to others.
55
The court seems bothered by a disposition of the case that would, in
effect, permit a buyer to be represented by an attorney in a real estate
transaction, an attorney among whose primary functions is the
identification of possible conflicting claims to the land, and to allow that
attorney to in fact be clearly notified of the existence of a prior
conflicting claim, without there following the normal legal consequence
to the buyer.5 6 While avoiding this phrasing directly, the court seems to
imply that there is at most something fraudulent, and at least something
inherently unfair to third parties possessing conflicting claims, for the
buyer to be able to hold out to them an agent who is especially
authorized to collect such claims on behalf of the buyer, to have the third
parties provide this agent with full notice, and then to have the usual
consequence of that notice negated as a result of a feature of the
relationship between the buyer and his agent. 7 Why should the third
party necessarily suffer because the agent has interests adverse to the
principal?
The court concludes:
A diversity of interest on the part of the agent is of no significance to
53. Farr, 199 N.E.2d at 372-73.
54. Id. at 371.
55. Id. at 373.
56. See generally id at 372-73.
57. See generally id. at 372-73.
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third persons, such as plaintiff, unless it placed the agent's act
beyond his authority. Nothing can alter the fact that the attorney was
held out as a proper person to whom notice of outstanding equities
was to be given, and that his receipt of such notice from plaintiff was
within his authority, both as actually conferred and as apparent to
others. Once the attorney received plaintiff's notification, as
authorized by defendant, even a fraudulent or self-serving
concealment of that fact from the defendant would no more
extinguish plaintiffs protection than would a debtor's debt be
revived where he had paid his creditor's authorized agent for
collection, who thereafter embezzled the money collected [citations
omitted].
58
Thus, in the Farr case, Farr is determined to have the superior
claim to that of Hardy. 9 Hardy is denied the status of a bona fide
purchaser for value without knowledge because the knowledge of Farr's
prior claim was possessed by Hardy's agent, attorney Cash, and that
knowledge is legally imputed to Hardy despite the undisputed fact that
Cash was a dual, and thus in this case an adverse, agent.60 Hardy suffers
the consequences of the notice given to his adverse agent, and never
actually received by him, regardless of the existence of the adverse agent
exception to the imputed knowledge rule.6 '
One can think of the Farr case as representing an "agent for notice"
exception to the adverse agent exception to the imputed knowledge rule,
holding that the knowledge or notice of even an adverse agent will be
imputed to the principal if one of the primary duties to be performed by
the agent for the principal is the collection of just such knowledge or
notice. Alternatively, the Farr case can be read as creating a "dual
agent" exception to the adverse agent exception to the imputed
knowledge rule, holding that notice to or knowledge of a dual agent is
imputed to the principals regardless of the fact that the dual agent is
adverse to them.62 Either way, the Farr case, just like the Munroe case,
58. Id. at 372-73.
59. Id. at 373.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Astor v. Wells, 17 U.S. 466 (1819); Brown v. Jefferson County Nat'l Bank, 9
F. 258 (C.C.N.Y. 1881); Mittendorf v. J. R. Williston & Beane, Inc. 372 F. Supp. 821
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); Carter v. Town of Ottawa, 24 F. 546 (N.D. Ill. 1885); Emmons v.
Ingebretson, 279 F. Supp. 558 (N.D. Iowa 1968); Manley v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. of CA.,
816 P.2d 225 (Ariz. 1991); McHugh v. Duane, 53 A.2d 282 (D.C. 1947); Carlton v.
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clearly represents a significant exception to the adverse agent exception
to the imputed knowledge rule.
UNDERLYING RATIONALES
Munroe and Farr are not alone. They are not odd, isolated,
carefully selected instances of courts finding a reason not to apply the
adverse agent exception to the imputed knowledge rule in a
straightforward manner.63 This means that the imputed knowledge rule,
accurately summarized, includes, at least, the basic rule itself,64 the
confidential agent exception to the rule,65 the adverse agent exception to
the rule,6 6 and a list of specific, more or less ad hoc, exceptions to the
adverse agent exception to the rule.6 7 This is an unusually complicated
Moultrie Banking Co., 152 S.E. 215 (Ga. 1930); Taylor v. Felder, 59 S.E. 844 (Ga. Ct.
App. 1907); Herron v. Interstate Life & Accident Co., 190 S.E. 631 (Ga. Ct. App.
1937); Haas v. Sternbach, 41 N.E. 51 (Ill. 1894); J. & G. Lippman v. Rice Millers'
Distrib. Co., 100 So. 685 (La. 1924); Meier v. Goebel-Reid Grocery Co., 20 S.W.2d
605 (Mo. Ct. App. 1929); Barth v. Haase, 139 S.W.2d 1058 (Mo. Ct. App. 1940); Losey
v. Simpson, 11 N.J. Eq. 246 (N.J. Ch. 1856); Turner v. Kuehnle, 64 A. 478 (N.J. Ch.
1906); Glen Oaks Club v. Glen Oaks Holding Co., 86 N.Y.S.2d 568 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1948), affd 88 N.Y.S.2d 257 (N.Y. App. Div. 1949); Cmty. Sav. & Loan Ass'n. v.
Lubbock Sav. & Loan Ass'n., 509 S.W.2d 448 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974); Foster v. Blake
Heights Corp., 530 P.2d 815 (Utah 1974); Melms v. Pabst Brewing Co., 66 N.W. 518
(Wis. 1896); Ross v. Northrup, King & Co., 144 N.W. 1124 (Wis. 1914); Johnson v.
Blumer, 197 N.W. 340 (Wis. 1924).
63. See, e.g., Dillon v. Berg, 326 F. Supp. 1214, 1224 (D. Del. 1971); Ctr. v.
Hampton Affiliates, Inc., 66 N.Y.2d 782, 799-800 (1985); Blumberg v. Taggart, 5
N.W.2d 388, 393-95 (Minn. 1942); Willcox v. Goess, 92 F.2d 8, 10-11 (2d Cir. 1937);
Eitel v. Schmidlapp, 459 F.2d 609, 615-16 (4th Cir. 1972); Matanuska Valley Bank v.
Arnold, 223 F.2d 778, 781-82 (9th Cir. 1955). See also the cases cited supra notes 9, 32
and 62.
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 268 (1958).
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 281 (1958).
66. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 279, 282 (1958).
67. See WILLIAM A. GREGORY, THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP §§ 59, 62,
64 (2001); see also 3 AM JUR 2D. AGENCY § 280, 2 (2004)
The rule that the knowledge of an agent acting adversely to the principal will not be
imputed to the latter may also not apply if the failure of the agent to act upon or to
reveal the information results in a violation of a contractual or relational duty of the
principal to a person harmed thereby (citing State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Sevier, 537
P.2d 88 (Ore. 1975) and City of Fort Worth v. Pippen, 439 S.W.2d 660 (Tex. 1969)).
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and unwieldy structure for a doctrine of the common law, one of whose
traditional characteristics is its relative elegance.68 What could explain
this phenomenon?
The unusual complexity and lack of elegance in the structure of the
imputed knowledge rule can be traced to a deep, underlying tension
between competing rationales supporting the rule itself. These
independent rationales for the rule are in harmony supporting the
existence of the imputed knowledge rule and the confidential
relationship exception to the rule. They diverge markedly, however,
with respect to the existence and nature of the adverse agent exception.
Why should there exist an imputed knowledge rule in agency law at
all? Why should the law ever formally pretend that a principal has
received knowledge or notice of a particular matter based only upon
evidence that an agent of the principal has received it? Why not simply
require the party seeking to charge the principal with the knowledge or
notice to establish directly that the principal actually received it?
THE EVIDENTIARY SURROGACY RATIONALE
One possible, and entirely plausible, reason to impute knowledge to
a principal without direct evidence thereof is that, in the face of
evidentiary uncertainty, the assumption that the agent in fact passed
relevant knowledge on to her principal gets it factually right more often
than assuming that the agent failed to do so. 69 This could be called the
68. See DeMott, supra note 5, at 291 ("Imputation has been characterized as a
disorderly doctrine that is difficult to rationalize and to justify or explain in any
satisfying way.") (citing F.M.B. Reynolds, BOWSTEAD AND REYNOLDS ON AGENCY 441
(1 7 th ed. 2001); see also Peter Watts, Imputed Knowledge in Agency Law - Excising
The Fraud Exception, 117 L.Q.R. 300 (2001)
There are some areas of the law of agency that remain seriously disordered. The case
law on imputed knowledge is undoubtedly one of them. It has become almost
customary for judges to recite Palles C.B.'s statement in Taylor v. Yorkshire
Insurance Co., 'But when a question of notice, or knowledge, arises, we find ourselves
overwhelmed in a sea of authorities, not altogether reconcilable with each other...
(quoting Taylor v. Yorkshire Insurance Co., 2 I.R. 1, 21 (1913)).
69. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 3,
2002); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4,
2003)
Pragmatic considerations also justify charging a principal with notice of facts that an
agent knows... Most agents most of the time fulfill their duties, including the duty to
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evidentiary surrogacy rationale for the imputed knowledge rule.
From the perspective of the evidentiary surrogacy rationale, the
imputed knowledge rule is necessary to resolve a factual dispute
between the parties as to whether the principal actually possessed certain
legally relevant knowledge or notice. Typically, the notice in question
was to be provided by the third party and the principal's receipt is
critical to the resolution of a legal dispute between the principal and the
third party, such as whether the third party successfully has triggered an
option offered by the principal or whether the principal has the status of
a bona fide purchaser for value without knowledge. If both the principal
and the third party agree that the notice was not successfully given, or if
both agree that the principal actually received it, then there is no dispute
between the parties on this point that requires resolution by the courts.
However, if the parties are not in agreement, then the courts must decide
the factual issue in one way or the other. Making this problem more
difficult for courts is the likelihood that most, if not all, of the relevant
evidence will come from the testimony of the two interested parties
themselves.
This basic situation remains essentially the same when the principal
is doing business with the third party through an authorized agent. The
principal and the third party usually agree that the third party has
provided the notice in question to the agent, but then disagree as to
whether the agent successfully transmitted it to the principal. Again, the
evidence relevant to resolving this issue comes largely from the
testimony of the interested parties: the principal, the agent, and the third
party. Given that the positions of the parties are in conflict, and that the
relevant evidence comes from thoroughly self-interested sources, the
litigation process is rarely of much value to the court in resolving the
factual dispute. After all, the agent can be expected to feel significant
pressure to confirm the assertion of the principal (who is, typically, the
agent's employer or client) that he never actually received the third
party's notice from the agent, especially if the lack of receipt is legally
advantageous to the principal and the principal agrees to hold the agent
harmless for the failure to provide him the notice.
disclose material facts to the principal or to co-agents designated by the principal. If
both agent and principal deny that an agent transmitted knowledge of a particular fact,
a third party may confront difficulties in proving otherwise.
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What is the court to do in such circumstances? The answer is
provided by the imputed knowledge rule. 0 Assuming that, in the
normal course, an agent will dutifully pass along to the principal
relevant notice or knowledge received from a third party, the imputed
knowledge rule operates in the absence of, and as a surrogate for,
credible direct evidence and puts into effect a conclusive presumption
that the agent did in fact successfully transmit the knowledge or notice
to the principal.7 Like any assumption, the operation of the imputed
knowledge rule will not always get it right, but so long as it is true that
most agents will perform their duty to the principal adequately and
convey to them important knowledge or notice that they receive, then
the rule will get it right more often, and probably much more often, than
would a rule that assumes the agent's breach of duty and failure to
transmit.72 Again, in the absence of credible conclusive evidence either
way, the court is forced to, in effect, embrace one or the other of these
factual assumptions in order to resolve the dispute between the parties.
The evidentiary surrogacy rationale not only supports the existence
of the basic imputed knowledge rule, it also satisfactorily explains the
existence of both the confidential relationship and the adverse agent
exceptions to the rule. An easy assumption of agent transmission of
knowledge or notice to the principal is not really tenable in
circumstances in which the agent has acquired the knowledge from the
70. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 268 (1958).
71. See Apollo Fuel Oil v. United States, 195 F.3d 74, 76-77 (2d Cir. 1999); Triple
A Mgmt. Co. v. Frisone, 81 Cal. Rptr. 2d 669, 678-79 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999). See also
Daniel S. Kleinberger, Guilty Knowledge, 22 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 953, 971 n.100
(1996). The evidentiary surrogacy rationale has also been used to rationalize the
operation of the imputed knowledge rule in English law. See Peter Watts, Imputed
Knowledge In Agency Law - Excising The Fraud Exception, 117 L.Q.R. 300, 307
(2001)
According to the doctrine of Equity, a purchaser has constructive notice of that which
his solicitor, in the transaction of the purchase, knows with respect to the existence of
the rights which other persons have in the property.... [I]t is a moot question upon
what principle this doctrine rests. It has been held by some that it rests on this: that
the probability is so strong that the solicitor would tell his client what he knows
himself, that it amounts to an irresistible presumption that he did tell him; and so you
must presume actual knowledge on the part of the client (quoting Boursot v. Savage,
L.R. 2 Eq. 134, 142 (1866)).
72. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 2003).
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third party within the context of a formally confidential relationship.73
Now, unlike the usual case, the agent will most likely have to breach the
confidence that he owes to the third party in order to convey such
knowledge to the principal, and the agent may well be exposed to
liability to the third party as a result. In such circumstances, it is not at
all clear that most agents will in fact break the confidentiality owed to
the third party and transmit the information to the principal, and the
appropriate legal response to this altered probability of agent
conveyance is the maintenance of a confidential relationship exception
to the imputed knowledge rule.74
Similarly, the likelihood of full and accurate agent transmission of
knowledge or notice to the principal is greatly diminished in those
situations in which the agent possesses interests that are adverse to, and
thus in conflict with, those of the principal. 75 As Justice Van Voorhis
puts it in his dissenting opinion in the case of Farr v. Newman,
... the basis on which the principal is charged with knowledge of the
agent is that it is presumed that the latter will normally communicate
the information to his principal in the course of the performance of
his duties [citation omitted], but such an inference is not indulged
where the agent or attorney is already employed by another arty
having an adverse interest respecting the transaction in question.
Thus the existence of the adverse agent exception to the imputed
knowledge rule.
THE RISK ALLOCATION RATIONALE
While the evidentiary surrogacy rationale makes sense of the
imputed knowledge rule and its confidential relationship and adverse
agent exceptions, it does not support the result in either the case of
73. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmts. b and e (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 2003).
74. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 281 (1958).
75. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmts. b and c (Tentative Draft
No. 4, 2003); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmts. b and c
(Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002).
76. Farr v. Newman, 199 N.E.2d 369, 374 (N.Y. 1964) (dissenting opinion of Van
Voorhis, J., dissenting).
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Munroe v. Harriman77 or Farr v. Newman v8 nor does it make sense of
the general principles which these cases represent. In Munroe, the fact
that Harriman was undoubtedly an adverse agent to his principal, the
bank, did not prevent the court from imputing to the bank knowledge
possessed by Harriman. The court ignored the usual operation of the
adverse agent exception to the imputed knowledge rule because
Harriman was the sole actor in obtaining securities for the bank.79
However, from an evidentiary surrogacy perspective, it is very hard to
explain why Harriman, with interests in direct conflict with those of the
bank, should be any more likely to divulge fully and accurately the
knowledge that he possessed regarding his acquisition of the securities
to the bank because he was, or was not, the sole actor for the bank in the
transaction.8 ° More generally, it is difficult to see why any agent who is
adverse to the principal and motivated not to disclose fully, would have
his incentives in this regard significantly altered in those circumstances
in which he can be characterized as a sole actor agent. Thus, it is fair to
conclude that the evidentiary surrogacy rationale for the imputed
knowledge rule does not support the existence of a sole actor exception
to the adverse agent exception to the rule.
In the case of Farr v. Newman, the court held that the adverse agent
exception to the imputed knowledge rule should not apply because the
attorney was an agent for notice, possessing a primary responsibility to
collect exactly the kind of knowledge and notice that the third party
wished to impute to the principal.81 Again, however, the fundamental
insight supporting the adverse agency exception from an evidentiary
surrogacy rationale perspective, that an agent with significant interests in
conflict with those of the principal can not be assumed to have engaged
in full disclosure to the principal, remains valid regardless of whether
the agent's basic duties included the collection of the knowledge or
notice in question or not. In other words, the ability of the third party to
characterize the adverse agent as an agent for notice appears to have
little relevance to the question of how likely it is that the adverse agent
will have in fact conveyed the relevant information to the principal.
77. 85 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1936).
78. 199 N.E.2d 369 (N.Y. 1964).
79. See Munroe, 85 F.2d at 496-97.
80. See generally Munroe, 85 F.2d 493.
81. Farr, 199 N.E.2d at 372-73.
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Thus, it is fair to conclude that the evidentiary surrogacy rationale also
does not support the existence of an agent for notice exception to the
adverse agent exception to the imputed knowledge rule.
While the evidentiary surrogacy rationale does an impressive job of
supporting and explaining much of the imputed knowledge rule doctrine,
there exists a very different, wholly independent line of analysis that
also makes sense of much of the imputed knowledge rule jurisprudence.
This second approach to explaining the imputed knowledge rule can be
called the risk allocation rationale.82
From the perspective of the risk allocation rationale, it does not
matter whether the agent in fact transmitted any knowledge or notice
that he received to the principal or not. As has been noted already, the
court is unlikely to have before it objective, fully credible evidence with
which to decide this factual issue. Moreover, even in cases in which it
can be shown that the principal did not actually receive the knowledge
or the notice from the agent, not all such situations should, in fairness,
result in the principal's legal protection from that knowledge or notice.
For instance, it is possible that the third party successfully provided the
notice to the agent, and the agent took all reasonable means to convey
the notice to the principal, but the principal was simply not available to
receive it, and did not in fact receive it. In such a case, should the issue
of the third party's effective exercise of an option that must be triggered
by notice, or the status of the principal as a bona fide purchaser for value
without knowledge, be resolved in favor of the principal because it is
82. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 8A cmt. a (1958) ("The rules
designed to promote the interests of these enterprises are necessarily accompanied by
rules to police them. It is inevitable that in doing their work, either through negligence
or excess of zeal, agents will harm third persons or will deal with them in unauthorized
ways. It would be unfair for an enterprise to have the benefit of the work of its agents
without making it responsible to some extent for their excesses and failures to act
carefully. The answer of the common law has been the creation of special agency
powers or, to phrase it otherwise, the imposition of liability upon the principal because
of unauthorized or negligent acts of his servants and other agents. These powers or
liabilities are created by the courts primarily for the protection of third persons, either
those who are harmed by the agent or those who deal with the agent. In the long run,
however, they inure to the benefit of the business world and hence to the advantage of
employers as a class, the members of which are plaintiffs as well as defendants in
actions brought upon unauthorized transactions conducted by agents." Emphasis
added.)
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clear that the principal did not actually receive the relevant notice or
knowledge?
The risk allocation rationale looks at situations involving agents
gathering information and notice on behalf of principals and recognizes
that there will inevitably exist some percentage of these situations in
which the knowledge or notice will not reach the principal successfully.
In some of these situations, the failure to transmit will clearly be the
fault of the agent, in others clearly not, and in still others it will be
difficult to tell. In some of these situations, the failure will clearly be the
fault of the principal, in others clearly not, and in still others it will be
difficult to tell. In some situations, both the principal and the agent may
be at fault, or neither.
The risk allocation rationale is indifferent to whether the knowledge
or notice was successfully transmitted to the principal or not, and if the
information clearly was not transmitted, the risk allocation rationale is
indifferent to the reason.83 Instead, the risk allocation rationale looks at
these situations and asks: As between the principal and the third party,
who should appropriately bear the risk of knowledge or notice that has
been received by the agent but not successfully transmitted to the
principal?8 4 Given that the principal is the one who generally selects and
hires the agent, who monitors the agent's activity and compensates him,
who has the power to terminate the agency and on whom the agent may
depend for future references and referrals, it is, in general, the principal
who is in the best position to manage the risk of a possible failed
transmission."
Again, if the law were to allocate to the principal the risk of failed
83. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §5.03 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003)
("An agent also has a duty, unless otherwise agreed, to use reasonable effort to transmit
material facts to the principal or to co-agents designated by the principal. A principal's
right to control an agent engables the principal to consider whether and how best to
monitor agents to ensure compliance with these duties. A principal may not rebut the
imputation of an agent's notice of a fact by establishing that the agent kept silent.").
84. Id.
85. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003)
("Imputation creates incentives for a principal to choose agents carefully and to use care
in delegating functions to them. Additionally, imputation encourages a principal to
develop effective procedures for the transmission of material facts, while discouraging
practices that isolate the principal from facts known to the agent. This serves the
function of assuring the reasonable expectations of third parties who deal with a
principal through an agent designated by the principal.").
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agent transmission of knowledge or notice, principals in general could
respond to this burden by more carefully selecting their agents, more
closely monitoring them, more vigorously disciplining them, more
vigilantly crafting procedures for the receipt of information from agents
and more diligently establishing procedural redundancies for important
transmissions.86 On the other hand, if the law were to allocate to the
third party the risk of failed agent transmission to the principal, then the
most likely response by third parties would be either to bypass notice to
the agent and provide it directly to the principal, or to provide required
notice routinely to both the agent and the principal.87 Both strategies
threaten to undermine the powerful efficiency available through the use
of agents that agency law is in part intended to create and support.
Pretty clearly, as between the principal and the third party, the principal
is the least cost avoider of failed transmission of knowledge or notice
between the agent and the principal.
Therefore, from this perspective, the basic imputed knowledge rule
makes sense as an appropriate allocation to the principal of the risk of
failure of transmission of knowledge or notice from the agent to the
principal. This allocation, and thus the basic rule, makes sense
regardless of whether the transmission from agent to principal was
completed successfully or not. If the transmission failed, the basic rule
makes sense whether that failure was the fault of the principal, the agent,
both or neither.
Can the risk allocation rationale for the imputed knowledge rule
accommodate the confidential relationship exception to the rule?
Probably not on its own terms. That is to say that the fact that the agent
has acquired the knowledge or notice at issue from a third party within
the context of a legally confidential relationship, by itself, most likely
does not change the presumption that as between the principal and the
86. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003);
Duckworth v. Bernstein, 466 A.2d 517, 523 (Md. App., 1983) ("It is the principal who
has selected the agent, and if he has chosen unwisely, it is he who should bear the
burden, and not a third party who has dealt with the agent to the third party's
detriment.").
87. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003)
("Imputation also supports the efficiencies to be achieved in many situations when
parties communicate through agents instead of through direct principal-to-principal
communication.").
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third party, the principal is the preferred manager of the risk of
transmission failure.
However, it may be the case that in certain circumstances,
allocation of the risk of transmission failure to the preferred party is not
the preeminent goal of the law. Occasionally, the goal of optimal risk
allocation may conflict with other important social policies. One such
policy could be the maintenance and support of legally confidential
relationships.
If the imputed knowledge rule did not have a confidential
relationship exception, then agents, like doctors and attorneys, who
obtain knowledge that is relevant and valuable to their principal within
the context of a confidential communication with a third party would be
caught in a difficult dilemma. 88  Either they would convey the
information to their principal and violate the confidentiality owed to the
third party or they would honor the confidentiality and deprive the
principal of important knowledge which the principal will nevertheless
be legally deemed to possess. Principals anticipating such a situation
could be expected to try to avoid having knowledge imputed to them
which they did not in fact receive by exerting considerable pressure on
these agents to breach their confidentiality and communicate the
information they have received from the third party to the principal.89
It seems clear that an imputed knowledge rule without a
confidential agent exception would work against, and thus to some
degree compromise, the social benefits that are sought by the creation
and maintenance of legally confidential relationships. Thus, while the
risk allocation rationale may not directly support a confidential
relationship exception to the imputed knowledge rule, it can be said that
the existence of the exception is consistent with the rationale to the
extent that it demonstrates a social choice to prefer the goals of
confidentiality over optimal risk allocation when the two come into
conflict.
It can be argued further that the existence of the confidential
relationship exception to the imputed knowledge rule is not deeply
destructive of the optimal risk allocation sought by the basic rule for at
88. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 281, 281 cmt. a, 281 cmt. b (1958).
89. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003)
("Imputation reduces the risk that a principal may deploy agents as a shield against the
legal consequences of facts the principal would prefer not to know.").
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least two reasons. First, the number of instances in which agents obtain
information of legal significance to their principal from third parties
while in a legally confidential relationship with those third parties can be
expected to be quite small. 90 Certainly they can be expected to represent
a very small percentage of all situations in which an agent obtains
knowledge or notice that is legally significant to the principal and to
which the imputed knowledge rule might apply.
Second, the confidential relationship exception applies to situations
in which the third party can reasonably determine in advance that the
exception will be in effect.91 This can be called the quality of self-
identification. The creation and operation of any exception to the
imputed knowledge rule will, in effect, reverse the normal allocation of
risk created by the rule and encourage the third party rather than the
principal to insure that the legally relevant knowledge or notice is
actually received by the principal.92 Given this, it is important that the
third party be reasonably able to identify those situations to which an
exception is likely to apply and special precautionary measures are
necessary. In the absence of reasonably certain self-identification, third
parties could be expected to insure against the possibility of the
exception applying by engaging in precautionary measures in a wide
range of circumstances. To the extent that the primary precautionary
measure available to third parties in the imputed knowledge rule context
is direct communication to the principal, either bypassing or duplicating
communications with the agent, and thus eroding the usual efficiency of
agency, a broader than necessary range of precautionary behavior should
90. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 281 cmt. a (1958) ("The rule stated in
this section applies most frequently where an attorney at law receives information from
a client under such circumstances that he has a duty not to reveal it without the client's
permission.... The rule also applies to confidences given to physicians in jurisdictions
in which physicians are privileged or required not to reveal confidences, and to other
situations in which one has a duty to a third person which creates in him a privilege not
to reveal or a privilege of his own by virtue of which he can act irrespective of the
information.").
91. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 281 cmt. a (1958); Confidential
relationships are entered into voluntarily. See e.g. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT
R. 1.2 (2003) (On formation of the attorney client relationship.); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TRUSTS §§ 10-16 (2003) (Creation of a trust relationship through the trust
instrument).
92. See supra note 86.
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not be encouraged.93 Thus it is important from a risk allocation
perspective that any exception to the basic imputed knowledge rule be
reasonably self-identifying to the third party.
Generally, given the relative rarity of such relationships, third
parties will know in advance whether they are in a legally confidential
relationship with an agent of the principal when they are conveying
legally significant knowledge or notice to the agent.94 They can then, in
those circumstances, take special precautions to communicate the
knowledge or notice directly to the principal. While such precautions
generally work against the usual efficiency of agency, one can take
comfort in the case of the confidential relationship exception that such
precautions will be encouraged in only a small percentage of cases.
Thus, it can be said that the confidential relationship exception to the
imputed knowledge rule is at least understandable within, and to that
extent consistent with, the risk allocation rationale for the imputed
knowledge rule.
This same claim cannot be made with any confidence regarding the
adverse agent exception to the imputed knowledge rule. As noted
earlier, there are a large number of possible reasons why an agent might
fail to successfully transmit relevant information to her principal,
ranging from a conscious choice on the part of the agent, to a variety of
combinations of carelessness by the agent and the principal, to pure
accident. 95 Except in a very limited set of such circumstances, the
fundamental logic of the risk allocation rationale supports the
application of the basic imputed knowledge rule, and not the adverse
agent exception.
In evaluating the status of the adverse agent exception to the
imputed knowledge rule within the context of the risk allocation
rationale, one should ask: As between the principal and the third party,
who is best able to manage the risk of agent transmission failure caused
by the agent's possession of interests in the transaction that are adverse
to those of the principal? As in the case of transmission failure in the
absence of agent adverse interests, the principal may effectively
minimize transmission failure in adverse agent situations, even if she
may not be able to completely eliminate it, by investing additional
93. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 281 cmt. a (1958).
94. See supra note 91.
95. See supra notes 82-83 and accompanying text.
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resources in more effective agent selection, monitoring, disciplining,
termination, and redundant transmission procedures. In other words, the
principal would seem to enjoy essentially the same panoply of
precautionary options with respect to the existence of an adverse agent,
or transmission failure by an adverse agent, as she does in the case of
transmission failure for any other reason. Thus, from the principal side
of the risk allocation analysis, there exists no compelling reason to shift
the risk of transmission failure away from the principal in those
situations in which the agent possesses interests that are adverse to those
of the principal.
The third party's primary precautionary option in circumstances of
a suspected adverse agent is the communication of the relevant
information directly to the principal, just as it is in situations in which no
adverse agent interests are involved. However, unlike those situations to
which the confidential relationship exception will apply, it is not likely
that the third party will know in advance, or at all, that the agent with
whom she is dealing possesses interests that are adverse to those of the
principal. Such circumstances lack the quality of self-identification
from the third party's point of view. The inability of third parties to
identify reliably in advance circumstances to which the adverse agent
exception is likely to apply will cause third parties to avoid
communication to the principal through the agent, or to duplicate it, in a
far broader range of circumstances than is actually necessary or
desirable. Such an overbroad pattern of precautionary investment is an
inevitable consequence of the lack of third party self-identification in the
operation of the adverse agent exception and it encourages a wasteful
expenditure of resources by third parties.
Given the above considerations, one can conclude that the adverse
agent exception to the imputed knowledge rule is not preferred by either
the principal or the third party side of risk allocation analysis, and thus
that the existence of the adverse agent exception to the imputed
knowledge rule is not supported by the risk allocation rationale. Stated
slightly differently, one can conclude that from a risk allocation
perspective, the possibility of an adverse agent failing to transmit
successfully to the principal important knowledge or notice is a problem
far better managed by the principal than by the third party. As a result,
the law in this area should not create or maintain a general exception to
the imputed knowledge rule, which in effect allocates the risk of agent
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failure to the third party, that applies to situations in which the agent
possesses interests in the transaction that are adverse to those of the
principal.
Once one clarifies that the risk allocation rationale for the imputed
knowledge rule does not support a general adverse agent exception, then
the existence of a variety of exceptions to the adverse agent exception
becomes understandable. Courts, or majorities on courts, that
understand the imputed knowledge rule from a risk allocation
perspective, appear to be seeking some plausible rationale in adverse
agent cases to justify not applying the established exception. Here it is
the sole actor exception to the adverse agent exception. There it is the
agent for notice exception. These exceptions to the adverse agent
exception are so appealing because they lead to a result in the case, the
application of the basic imputed knowledge rule unmodified by the
adverse agent exception, that makes fundamental sense from the risk
allocation rationale perspective.
One can sense this underlying dynamic in the decision of the court
in the Munroe v. Harriman case:
But to explain the [imputed knowledge rule] cases in terms of
presumptions is not a rational analysis. The presumption of
communication is a pure fiction, contrary to the fact, for it is only
when the agent has failed to communicate his knowledge that any
occasion arises for imputing it to the principal. The rational
explanation of the Distilled Spirits case is that common justice
requires that one who puts forward an agent to do his business
should not escape the consequences of notice to, or knowledge of,
his agent.
96
Similarly, the tension that exists between the evidentiary surrogacy
rationale and the risk allocation rationale regarding the adverse agent
exception to the imputed knowledge rule is evident in the byplay
between the majority and the dissenting opinions in the case of Farr v.
Newman. The dissent believes that:
The reason for [the adverse agent exception to the imputed
knowledge rule] ... is manifestly that the basis on which the
principal is charged with knowledge of the agent is that it is
presumed that the latter will normally communicate the information
96. Munroe v. Harrison, 85 F.2d 493, 495 (2d Cir. 1936).
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to his principal in the course of the performance of his duties
[citation omitted], but such an inference is not indulged where the
agent or attorney is already employed by another party having an
adverse interest respecting the transaction in question.
97
The majority, in contrast, believes that:
The mere fact that the attorney acted for both parties in the real
estate transfer, with defendant Hardy's knowledge, cannot insulate
defendant from his agent's knowledge to the detriment of the
otherwise superior right of a third party. ... the presumption
sometimes relied upon to support imputation, i.e., that an agent will
communicate to his principal all relevant matters, has no place in this
situation. If, under the substantive rules of equity and agency, actual
knowledge by the principal is unnecessary, the presumption of
communication becomes irrelevant. ... It may thus be seen that the
question in this case is not an evidentiary one of presumptions or
inferences; it is one of substantive law. If the agent was authorized
to receive notice, and did receive it within the scope of his authority,
that act as such binds the principal as does any act performed within
an agent's authority [citations omitted].
98
LOOKING INTO THE FUTURE
There may be reason to hope for greater coherence and
predictability in imputed knowledge rule jurisprudence in the future.
Such hope comes in the form of the American Law Institute's current
draft of Restatement (Third) of Agency.
In 1923, acting upon the December 1914 recommendation of the
American Association of Law Schools, the American Law Institute
(ALI) was founded.99  The new organization brought together the
preeminent members of the legal community to meet the need for "a
permanent organization for the improvement of the law."100 In 1933, the
ALI published the Restatement of Agency, closely following the 1932
97. Farr v. Newman, 199 N.E.2d 369, 374 (N.Y. 1964).
98. Farr, 199 N.E.2d at 371-72.
99. John P. Frank, The American Law Institute: 1923-1998, in THE AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE SEVENTY-FIFTH ANNIVERSARY: 1923-1998 3, 8 (1998).
100. Id. at 3, 8-9 (citing statement of Elihu Root).
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publication of the Restatement of Contracts, making it the second
Restatement of the Law to be published by this eminent group of
scholars.' l  The first two restatements of agency were stewarded
through the process of being drafted, accepted and published by two of
the foremost authorities on agency law. The Restatement was brought to
fruition by Floyd R. Mechem and the Restatement (Second) was
shepherded through by Warren A. Seavey.10 2  In 2000, under the
direction of Deborah A. DeMott, the new reporter of the Restatement of
Agency, the ALI first discussed the first two chapters of the Restatement
(Third) of Agency. 10 3 From there, the Restatement (Third) of Agency
has been undergoing an entire redraft up to the present time.
10 4
The relevant provisions of Restatement (Third) of Agency are
sections 5.03 and 5.04.'1 5 Section 5.03 reads, "Notice of a fact that an
agent knows or has reason to know is imputed to a principal if
knowledge of the fact is material to the agent's duties to the principal
and to the principal's legal relations with third parties. Notice is not so
imputed if the agent acts adversely to the principal as stated in § 5.04 or
is subject to a duty not to disclose the fact to the principal.' '0 6 This is a
more or less straight-forward articulation of the classic imputed
knowledge rule. It begins with the basic doctrine, imputing to the
principal information received by the agent within the scope of the
agency.07 It then sets forth the two traditional exceptions: the adverse
agent exception and the confidential relationship exception.'0 8
101. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY ix (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2000).
102. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY ix (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2000).
103. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY ix (Tentative Draft No. 1, 2000).
104. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY xi (Tentative Draft No. 22, 2001).
105. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003).
106. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002). This
has subsequently been revised to read:
§ 5.03 Imputation of Notice of Fact to Principal
For purposes of determining a principal's legal relations with third parties,
notice of a fact that an agent knows of has reason to know is imputed to the
principal if knowledge of the fact is material to the agent's duties to the principal,
unless the agent
a) acts adversely to the principal as stated in § 5.04, or
b) is subject to a duty to another not to disclose the fact to the principal.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003).
107. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003).
108. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002);
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So far, the Restatement (Third) of Agency is a standard codification
of the traditional doctrine and does not seem to offer much promise of
improvement. Optimism dims further upon a first reading of section
5.04, which states:
§ 5.04 An Agent Who Acts Adversely to a Principal
(1) Notice is not imputed to a principal of a fact that an
agent knows or has reason to know if the agent acts
adversely to the principal in the transaction or matter
without the principal's knowledge, unless
(a) the agent deals with a third party who does
not know or have reason to know that the agent
acts adversely to the principal and who reasonably
believes the agent to be authorized so to deal; or
(b) the principal knowingly retains a benefit from
action taken by the agent that the principal would
not otherwise have received.
(2) For purposes of this Chapter, an agent acts adversely to
a principal if the agent acts in the transaction or matter
without any intention of benefiting the principal by the
action taken.1
0 9
This section sets forth the adverse agent exception to the imputed
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003).
109. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002). This
has subsequently been revised to read:
§ 5.04 An Agent Who Acts Adversely to a Principal
For purposes of determining a principal's legal relations with third parties,
notice is not imputed to the principal of a fact that an agent knows or has reason to
know if the agent acts adversely to the principal in a transaction or matter for the
agent's own purposes or those of another person. Nevertheless, notice is imputed
a) when necessary to protect the rights of a third party who dealt with
the principal in good faith; or
b) when the principal has ratified or retained benefit from the agent's
action.
A third party who deals with a principal through an agent, knowing or having
reason to know that the agent acts adversely to the principal, does not deal in good
faith for this purpose.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003).
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knowledge rule, and identifies two exceptions to the exception, just as
the doctrine has been traditionally understood.110 Structurally, the
Restatement Third appears on first glance to faithfully codify the
imputed knowledge rule, and the multiple exceptions and myriad
exceptions to the adverse agent exception, that are symptomatic of the
unresolved policy tension that plagues the doctrine."'
A source of optimism emerges, however, upon closer examination.
The comments to section 5.03 clearly endorse the risk allocation
rationale for the imputed knowledge rule." 2 They state:
Imputation creates incentives for a principal to choose agents
carefully and to use care in delegating functions to them.
Additionally, imputation encourages a principal to develop effective
routines for the transmission of material facts, while discouraging
practices that isolate the principal from facts known to an agent. ....
Imputation thus recognizes the efficiencies to be achieved in many
situations when parties communicate through agents instead of
through direct principal-to-principal communication.
113
In contrast, the evidentiary surrogacy rationale receives only a
passing mention, and that less in the context of justifying the imputed
knowledge rule as an attempt to embrace the most accurate factual
assumption available than as part of a much vaguer collection of
"[p]ragmatic considerations."'1 14
Since the Restatement grounds the imputed knowledge rule
squarely in the theoretical justification of the risk allocation rationale,
why does it then also include an adverse agent exception to the rule? As
discussed herein, the risk allocation rationale simply does not support a
general adverse agent exception to the rule. One possible explanation is
that the existence of an adverse agent exception is manifestly clear in the
current case law and the Restatement, operating in its role as a
codification project, could simply not ignore it. Current imputed
knowledge rule jurisprudence is profoundly conflicted, and any attempt
to describe it accurately cannot help but display some of these same
110. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002).
111. See id.
112. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmts. (Tentative Draft
No. 3, 2002).
113. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002).
114. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002).
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features.
Assuming the need to recognize formally the existence of an
adverse agent exception, one must give great credit to the Restatement's
efforts to harmonize the exception with a risk allocation rationale for the
basic rule. This work takes place in section 5.04.1"5 The work begins at
the end of the section, in paragraph (2), where the Restatement defines
an adverse agent as one who, ". .. acts in the transaction or matter
without any intention of benefiting the principal by the action taken."
'
"
16
This is a remarkably narrow definition of an adverse agent for purposes
of the rule. According to this definition, the agent in question must not
just possess interests in the transaction that are in conflict with those of
the principal, which is the traditional approach, but must have so
completely abandoned his efforts on behalf of the principal that the
agent acts without any intention of benefiting the principal at all.117
Such a definition of adverse agent would exclude from the
operation of the adverse agent exception a wide range of cases that
conventionally have been thought to come clearly within its purview.
For example, it is not at all clear that the agent in Munroe"8 could be
characterized successfully as an adverse agent under this definition.
After all, Harriman, the agent in Munroe, might well have been argued
to be involved in bringing profitable loan business to the bank, or, at the
least, to be concerned with securing the loan with the fraudulently
obtained securities for the bank's benefit, even though it was also the
case that the loan was being made to him. The comments to section 5.04
make it clear that divided loyalty alone is not enough: "An agent is not
acting adversely if the agent acts with mixed motives, intending to
achieve a benefit for the principal as well as for the agent's own self or
for a third party."' Perhaps in reaction to the apparent narrowness of
115. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 (Tentative Draft No. 3,
2002) (defining adverse agent acts).
116. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04(b) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002).
117. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 3,
2002) ("an agent acts adversely to a principal when the agent acts with no intention of
benefiting the principal." (emphasis added)).
118. 85 F.2d 493 (2d Cir. 1936).
119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 3,
2002) (stating the principal is not affected by the knowledge of an agent as to matters
involved in a transaction in which an agent of the principal as, or on account of, an
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the resulting definition, the commentary does go on to then reassure that,
"An agent may act adversely toward a principal through conduct less
grievous than looting or embezzlement,"1 20 though, the implication
seems to be, it will take conduct fairly close to criminal for the agent to
achieve technically adverse status.
1 21
Similarly, pursuant to the definition in section 5.04, the attorney
double agent in Farr122 is most likely not an adverse agent whose
possession of relevant information is subject to the exception. The
attorney in Farr ran into difficulty not because he acted without any
intention of benefiting either principal, but because he too aggressively
sought a way of consummating the transaction that both principals
desired. 23 Indeed, the commentary to section 5.04 makes it clear that
the fact that the attorney in that case was representing parties on
opposite sides of the transaction does not, by itself, make him
technically adverse to either one:
An agent who acts as a dual agent... may not always act adversely
as to both or either of the agent's principals for purposes of
subsection (1). This is because whether an agent acts adversely
under subsection (2) turns solely on the subjective determination of
whether the agent acted with no intention of benefiting the
principal. 124
This very narrow definition of adverse agent in paragraph (2) of
section 5.04 severely narrows the scope and practical application of the
adverse agent exception to the imputed knowledge rule, and is thus
much more in harmony with the risk allocation rationale for the rule. If
this is not enough, however, section 5.04 contains three additional
limitations on the operation of the adverse agent exception. 125 The first,
contained in paragraph (1), is the requirement that the principal have no
adverse party).
120. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002).
121. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. c (Tentative Draft
No. 3, 2002) (illustrating adverse actions of agents).
122. See 199 N.E.2d 369 (NY, 1964) (holding that the mere fact the attorney acted
for both vendor and purchaser of realty, with purchaser's knowledge, could not insulate
purchaser).
123. See generally id.
124. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 cmt. c (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002).
125. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002).
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knowledge of the agent's adverse actions in order for the adverse agent
exception to apply. 126 The second, set forth in paragraph (1)(a), prevents
the application of the adverse agent exception against a third party who
was unaware that the agent was acting adversely to the principal. 127 The
third, contained in paragraph (1)(b), denies the use of the adverse agent
exception to a principal, even if all of the other requirements of 5.04 are
satisfied, if, "the principal knowingly retains a benefit from action taken
by the agent that the principal would not otherwise have received.
128
Section 5.04 therefore defines an adverse agent exception to the
imputed knowledge rule in a manner that requires for its successful
application that:
1) the agent to have acted in the matter in question without
any intention of benefiting the principal;
2) the principal to have been without any knowledge of the
agent's actions in this regard;
3) the third party to have been aware of the agent's adverse
status with respect to the principal; and
4) the principal not to have retained a benefit from the actions
of the agent. 1
29
Taken together, these requirements define an extremely narrow
version of the adverse agent exception to the imputed knowledge rule
that can be said to be as close to consistent with the risk allocation
rationale as is possible while still retaining an adverse agent exception.
If jurisdictions will in the future follow the lead of Restatement (Third)
of Agency in this regard, it will go a very long way toward making the
imputed knowledge rule more coherent and more predictable, and thus
more valuable.
126. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04(1) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002).
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04(l)(a) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002).
128. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04(1)(b) (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002).
129. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.04 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002).
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CONCLUSION
The imputed knowledge rule is currently characterized by
complexity and contradiction. The basic rule imputes to a principal
knowledge or notice received by an agent within the scope of the agent's
authority. 30 The principal is deemed to have received the information in
question even in the absence of any evidence that the agent successfully
transmitted it to the principal.
There are two well-established exceptions to the imputed
knowledge rule, one known as the confidential relationship exception
and the other known as the adverse agent exception.'31 The first applies
to situations in which the agent has obtained the information in question
from a third party in the context of a legally confidential relationship
with that third party. 132 The second comes into play when the agent
possesses interests in the transaction that are adverse to those of the
principal.1 33  Both operate, when successfully invoked, to prevent
relevant information received by the agent from being automatically
imputed to the principal, thus requiring the third party in such cases to
directly establish the principal's receipt of the relevant knowledge or
notice.
A significant number of cases exist that have created, in effect, a
variety of exceptions to the adverse agent exception to the imputed
knowledge rule.1 34  These cases identify discrete reasons for legally
imputing to a principal information received from an adverse agent,
despite the situation being one in which the adverse agent exception
would normally apply. The existence of these multiple exceptions to an
130. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 268, 272 (1958); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 5.03 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003); Munroe v. Harriman, 85 F.2d 493, 494-
95 (2d Cir. 1936); Farr v. Newman, 199 N.E.2d 369, 371 (NY, 1964).
131. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY §§ 281, 282 (1958); RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF AGENCY §§ 5.03, 5.04 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF AGENCY §§ 5.03, 5.04 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003).
132. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 281 (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY § 5.03 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY §
5.03 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003).
133. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 282 (1958); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY §§ 5.03, 5.04 (Tentative Draft No. 3, 2002); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
AGENCY §§ 5.03, 5.04 (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2003).
134. See supra notes 33, 64 and accompanying text.
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exception to the basic rule push the doctrine to a level of unusual
complexity for a long-standing part of the common law, and thus create
inevitable uncertainty in its application.
The above analysis suggests that the current complexity and
uncertainty surrounding the imputed knowledge rule is explained by the
existence of a fundamental tension residing at the heart of the doctrine.
This tension is created by the influence of competing conceptions of the
rule's basic purpose. From one perspective, here called the evidentiary
surrogacy rationale, the imputed knowledge rule is designed to provide
the most empirically plausible answer to the question of whether the
principal actually received the information in question from the agent
when no objective credible evidence exists to directly resolve the
issue.'35 The evidentiary surrogacy rationale supports the existence of
the basic imputed knowledge rule. It also supports the existence of both
the confidential relationship exception and the adverse agent exception.
It does not, however, support the various exceptions to the adverse agent
exception that have been carved out by various courts.
The competing understanding of the imputed knowledge rule, here
called the risk allocation rationale, views the imputed knowledge rule as
a mechanism for allocating between the principal and the third party the
risk of a failure of information transmission from the agent to the
principal. 3 6 Like the evidentiary surrogacy rationale, the risk allocation
rationale supports the existence of the basic imputed knowledge rule and
the confidential relationship exception to the rule. In sharp contrast to
the evidentiary surrogacy rationale, however, the risk allocation
rationale does not support the existence of the adverse agent exception
to the rule, except in a very limited set of circumstances. Therefore, the
risk allocation rationale inevitably serves as support for the
identification and creation of most any exception to the adverse agent
exception.
An evidentiary surrogacy perspective on imputed knowledge in
agency would generate an imputed knowledge rule and both a
confidential relationship exception and an adverse agent exception. A
135. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 3,
2002).
136. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF AGENCY § 5.03 cmt. b (Tentative Draft No. 3,
2002).
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risk allocation perspective would generate the basic rule and a
confidential relationship exception, but not a general adverse agent
exception. The current rule, in which both rationales intermingle and
mix, is doctrinally faithful to neither. As a result, the current version of
the rule is not fully coherent, unnecessarily complex, and unpredictable
in its application. Significant hope for improvement is promised by the
upcoming Restatement (Third) of Agency that appears to embrace the
risk allocation rationale and the doctrinal structure that logically follows.
